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Ab s t r a ct
We construct a me asure of Euro area c ycl ical effficienc , following the ap-
proach developed in Galí, Gertler and López-Salido (2002). Our measure -
wh i ch we c al l “ t he g a p ”- c or r e sp o n ds t o th e i nver s e of p r ic e ove r s o c ia l m ar -
ginal cost. Here we present a time series of this gap for the Euro area, as
we ll as it two comp onents, the price and wage markups. As with U.S. data,
the inefficiency gap is highly procyclical, and driven largely by countercycli-
cal movements in the wage markup. We are also able to use our gap variable
to derive a theory-based measure of the output gap for the Euro area, which
we can compare to other measures often used in applications. We also show
that the wage markup moves closely with the unemployment rate, as theory
would suggest. Finally, we discuss briefly the implications for monetary policy
of alternative interpretations of our evidence.
JEL Classi ficat ion : E3
Key Words: Business Cycles, Countercyclical Markups, Monetary Policy.
1 Introduction
In this paper we construct measures of cyclical aggregate inefficiency for the Euro area
based on the approach we proposed in an earlier paper (Galí, Gertler, and López-
Salido (2002), henceforth GGL). Our measure of inefficiency is given by the wedge
between the marginal product of labor and the household’s marginal rate of substi-
tution between consumption and leisure. That wedge is equivalent, to put it more
graphically, to the vertical distance between the labor supply and demand curves,
whereas the area between those curves measures the lost surplus due to deviating
from the first best. To the extent this area fluctuates with the business cycle, there
will be cyclical movements in the efficiency of resource allocation. By constructing a
time series measure of the Euro area inefficiency gap (or “Euro Gap” for short), we
are able to obtain some insight into the nature and sources of business cycles in the
Euro area.
As we show, the inefficiency gap corresponds to the inverse of the markup of
price over social marginal cost. Hence, procyclical movements in the inefficiency gap
are associated with countercyclical movements in this markup. We differ from the
conventional literature on markups and business cycles, however, by allowing for the
possibility of labor market frictions that introduce a wedge between the wage and
the household’s marginal rate of substitution, the true social cost of labor. Cyclical
movements in the overall markup, accordingly, may be the result not only of the
movement of the markup of prices over marginal costs, but also of the wage markup
over the marginal rate of substitution. Our approach will allow us to sort out the
relative importance of the price versus the wage markup in the fluctuation of the
overall markup, and hence of the inefficiency gap. In this respect, we are able to
ascertain not only the degree of cyclical inefficiency but also the extent to which
product market versus labor market rigidities may be responsible.
In addition, from our measure of the inefficiency gap, we are able to construct
7
a theory-based output gap, a more conventional indicator of cyclical inefficiency.
Traditional measures of the output gap may be suspect because they typically model
the unobserved, frictionless equilibrium level of output (i.e. the “natural level,”) in
some ad hoc fashion. With our approach, the measure of the natural level of output
is theory-based. As we show, our theory-based measure bears some correspondence
to a more traditional output gap measure. Finally, we are able to draw a connection
between our measure of the wage markup - the key factor underlying the inefficiency
gap - and the unemployment rate, another key cyclical indicator. The underlying
theory suggests a close correspondence. We show in fact that this is the case.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces our proposed gap measure
and its components. Section 3 presents the evidence on the behavior of the Euro gap.
We discuss its cyclical properties, and its relationship with standard cyclical indicators
in section 4. Section 5 discusses issues of interpretation and policy implications.
2 Measuring Cyclical Variations in Goods and La-
bor Market Inefficiencies
2.1 Introducing the Gap
Following GGL (2002) we introduce a measure of aggregate inefficiency which we
refer to as the gap. Formally, the gap is defined as follows:1
gapt = mrst −mpnt (1)
where mpnt and mrst denote, respectively, the (log) marginal product of labor and
(log) marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure. As discussed
in GGL (2002), the above gap measure has a simple relationship to measures of
inefficiency wedges in goods and labor markets, which we refer to, respectively, as
price and wage markups. Thus, we define the economy’s average price markup as:
1See Appendix 1 for details of how to derive the expressions of this section.
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µpt = pt − (wt −mpnt) (2)
where pt and wt denote the (log) average price and wage levels, and where wt−mpnt
can be interpreted as a measure of nominal marginal cost under the assumption of
wage-taking firms and no labor adjustment costs.
Analogously, we define the economy’s average wage markup as:
µwt = (wt − pt)−mrst (3)
i.e., the wedge between the wage and the marginal disutility of work, both expressed
in terms of consumption.
We can combine equations (2), (3), and (1) to derive a fundamental relation
linking the gap to the wage and price markups:
gapt = −(µpt + µwt ) (4)
Notice that an increase in our gap measure is associated with lower markups, and
hence a smaller distortion (i.e., an allocation closer to the efficient one).
Before we can construct measures of the gap and its components we need to make
some assumptions on technology and preferences. Those are discussed next.
2.2 A Parametric Model
We assume that technology is characterized by a constant elasticity of output with
respect to hours. In that case we have (up to an additive constant),
mpnt = yt − nt (5)
where yt is output and nt is hours (both in per capita terms). Combining equations
(2)and (5) yields:
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µpt = (pt + yt)− (wt + nt) (6)
≡ − ulct (7)
Hence the price markup can be measured (up to an additive constant) as minus the
(log) real unit labor costs, denoted by ulct .
Letting ct denote per capita consumption, we assume that the (log) marginal rate
of substitution takes the form (up to an additive constant) as:
mrst = σ ct + ϕ nt (8)
where σ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion and ϕ measures the elasticity of
the marginal disutility of labor. It follows from (3) that the wage markup is given
by:
µwt = (wt − pt)− (σ ct + ϕ nt) (9)
Finally, and given a measure of both the price and the wage markup, one can
obtain a measure of the gap using equation (4).
3 Evidence for the Euro Area
We now use the simple relationships derived in the previous section to construct
measures of the gap and its components for the Euro area. All the data are taken
from Fagan, Henry and Mestre (2001), and are described in Table 1.2
Constructing our measure of wage markup variations requires that we make an
assumption on σ and on ϕ. In our baseline calibration we set a unit value for both
parameters, in a way consistent with much of the business cycle literature. Further-
more, since we are interested in the cyclical component of gap and markup variations
2This data set has been recently used to estimate general equilibrium models with variable price
and wage markups for the Euro area by Smeets and Wouters (2003a and b).
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we detrend the variables constructed on the basis of (7), (9), and (4) by fitting a fifth
order polynomial of time.3
Figure 1 shows our empirical measure of the Euro gap, under our baseline calibra-
tion. Our gap variable is seen to display large and persistent fluctuations, suggesting
non-negligible variations in aggregate efficiency over the sample period considered.
Furthermore, the timing of the observed variations, as captured by the main peaks
and troughs, seems to match pretty well conventional accounts of the European busi-
ness cycle: thus, the gap experiences a large decline in the late 70s, starts a long
recovery in the mid 80s, reaches a peak in the early 90s, it declines until about 94,
and stabilizes thereafter.
We next decompose the observed movements of the gap into wage and price
markup variations. The wage markup measures were constructed using (9). The
price markup corresponds to minus the log of real unit labor costs, as implied by
(7). Figure 2 displays the behavior of those two variables over the sample period.
Notice that, once we remove the low frequency movement by means of our detrending
procedure, the wage markup still shows fluctuations of a magnitude and persistence
similar to those of the gap. By way of contrast, the cyclical fluctuations in the price
markup appear more tamed.
That visual impression is formalized in Table 1, which reports some basic statistics
for the gap, its components, and detrended GDP. Note first that the standard devi-
ation of the gap and the wage markup are similar, and large relative to detrended
output and the price markup. The four variables display a high positive autocor-
relation. Most interestingly, however, both the gap and the wage markup show a
high correlation with detrended GDP. That correlation is positive in the case of the
gap (confirming its procyclical nature) and negative in the case of the wage markup
3This procedure leads to virtually the same results as those obtained using a band-pass filter
which discards fluctuations outside a frequency range between 2 and 60 quarters (as recommended
by Staiger, Stock and Watson (2001)). See Appendix 2 and Appendix 3, for details.
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(which is thus countercyclical). The price markup, on the other hand, does not show
any significant cyclical behavior.
Figure 3 shows the behavior of the gap against the wage markup. To facilitate
visual inspection, we plot the inverse of the wage markup (−µwt ). The strong co-
movement between the two variables is clear to the naked eye. Put differently, the
evidence suggests that countercyclical variations in the wage markup account for the
bulk of fluctuations in the Euro area gap.4
We now turn to the analysis of the effects of alternative assumptions about the
coefficient of relative risk aversion and the labor supply elasticity on both the gap and
its components. Figures 4 and 5 display how changes in the labor supply elasticity
affect the properties of the gap and the wage markup, while keeping the risk aver-
sion at its baseline value of one. In Figure 4 we compare the baseline gap measure
(corresponding to ϕ = 1) with two alternative calibrations corresponding to lower
(ϕ = 5) and higher (ϕ = 0.1) labor supply elasticities.5 Notice that the size of gap
fluctuations is inversely related to the labor supply elasticity, and hence it increases
with ϕ.
Finally, Figure 5 translates this results into the comparison between fluctuations
in the gap and the wage markup (notice that, by construction, the difference between
these components corresponds to the price markup). Overall, the countercyclical
wage markup fluctuations are the dominant component of the time series properties
of the gap, though, as noted above, the higher the labor supply elasticity the lower
is the correlation between the gap and the wage markup.6
4Similar results can be found in GGL (2002) for the U.S. economy.
5While the micro-evidence suggests a small labor supply elasticity, the business cycle literature
tends to assume a high elasticity, typically unity and above. See discussion in GGL (2002). Evidence
for the Euro Area on the rationale for those parameter values can be found in Smeets and Wouters
(2003a) and in Andrés, López-Salido and Vallés (2003).
6Though we do not report the results here, it also clears that lower (higher) values of risk aversion
(σ) tend to dampem (increase) the fluctuations of the gap. See GGL (2002).
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Finally, in Figures 6(a) and 6(b) we demonstrate that the basic properties of the
Euro gap are not affected significantly when we use two alternative measures of the
marginal cost. Thus, the Euro gap measure displayed in Figure 6(a) uses a measure
of marginal cost that accounts for labor adjustment costs.7 In Figure 6(b) we use a
measure of the marginal rate of substitution that allows for time non-separabilities in
leisure (as advocated by Eichenbaum, Hansen and Singleton (1988)). The variation
patterns in the modified Euro gap measures are largely undistinguishable from the
baseline one, thus indicating the latter’s robustness to some plausible changes in
specification of preferences and technology.8
4 The Euro Gap, the Output Gap, and the Unem-
ployment Rate
In this section we discuss the connection between our gap and wage markup measures
and two traditional cyclical indicators: the output gap and the unemployment rate.
We also compare our implied measure of the output gap with other measures available
for the Euro area.
4.1 The Gap and the Output Gap
Usually, the output gap is defined as the deviation of output from its natural or
frictionless level, defined as the equilibrium value in the absence of nominal rigidities.
More formally we have, eyt ≡ yt − yt (10)
where eyt, and yt denote the output gap and the frictionless level of output, respec-
tively. In this paper, we show that under certain assumptions it is not possible to
derive an exact relation between the output gap and the inefficiency gap without
7In each case we follow the parametrization recommended by Rotemberg and Woodford (1999).
See Appendix 4 for details.
8Though we do not report the results here, it is clear from Figure 6(a) that the movements in
the gap are strongly associated with a countercyclical wage markup. See Appendix 4 for details.
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specifying a complete model. In doing that, we proceed in several steps. First, we
assume that the reduced form (log of) aggregate production function can be written
as:9
yt = a nt + zt (11)
where zt is exogenous or, at least, invariant to the degree of nominal rigidities. Think
of zt as a technology shifter.10 Second, given equation (11), we can derive the following
expression for the gap:
gapt =
µ
1− a+ ϕ
a
¶
yt + σ ct −
µ
1 + ϕ
a
¶
zt (12)
Third, we assume that the only source of gap variation lies in the presence of
nominal rigidities in labor and/or goods markets.11 Accordingly, if we let ct be the
level of consumption in the absence of nominal rigidities, then it follows that yt
satisfies
gapt =
µ
1− a+ ϕ
a
¶
yt + σ ct −
µ
1 + ϕ
a
¶
zt (13)
To obtain a relation between the output gap and our demeaned gap measuredgapt ≡ gapt − gapt, first combine equations (12) and (13):
dgapt = µ1− a+ ϕa
¶ eyt + σect (14)
where ect = ct−ct. If we disregard capital accumulation and other demand components
(so that ect ' eyt), then we can rearrange expression (14) as follows:
9See Appendix 1 for details.
10More generally, equation (11) allows the possibility of variable capital utilization. Hence, as
emphasized by Burnside and Eichenbaum (1995) and more recently King and Rebelo (1999). In
particular, those authors have shown that variable capital utilization will raise the effective output
elasticity of employment, a.
11Hence, we interpret the natural level of output as the level of output consistent with a constant
gap (which corresponds to its steady state value, gap).
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eyt = µ a
1 + ϕ+ a(σ − 1)
¶ dgapt (15)
From the previous expression, several comments are in order.12 First, we have
found a simple positive linear relationship between our measure of inefficiency and
the output gap. Second, under our baseline calibration, i.e. when preferences satisfy
a balanced growth condition (σ = 1), the two parameters that determine the mapping
between the gap and the output gap are the output elasticity to labor (a) and the
labor supply elasticity. To calibrate the former, we follow King and Rebelo (1999),
who argue that the evidence is consistent with a value of a of roughly unity. Moreover,
it is easy to see that when the labor supply elasticity is large enough, i.e. ϕ → 0,
then our gap measure corresponds to the output gap.
Figure 7(a) plots the output gap corresponding to our baseline calibration of the
gap jointly with a measure of the output gap constructed in the Area Wide Model of
the ECB. As can be seen from the graph, starting in the mid 70’s our measure captures
the main peaks and troughs of the AWM measure. As noted above, these results are
largely robust to alternative choices of the labor supply elasticity parameter.
4.2 Unemployment and the Wage Markup
As noted in the previous section most of the variations in the Euro gap are accounted
for by large variations in the wage markup. Here, and following Galí (1996), we show
the existence of a tight connection, both theoretical and empirical, between wage
markups and conventional unemployment measures. Let n∗t denote the quantity of
labor that the representative household is willing to supply at the currently prevailing
real wage (taking the latter as given, and conditional on the current marginal utility
of wealth), expressed in logs. We define the unemployment rate ut in period t as
12In GGL (2002) we show that we can also express, without loss of generality, the consumption
gap, ect, as a time varying proportion of the output gap, as follows: ect = ηt eyt. In the main text
we are assuming that ηt = 1. Changes in that baseline parameterization yields extremelly similar
results. See GGL (2002).
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ut ≡ n∗t − nt
where nt is actual employment (in logs).
The notional, “perfectly competitive” labor supply n∗t satisfies
σ ct + ϕ n∗t = wt − pt
On the other hand, from the definition of the wage markup we have
σ ct + ϕ nt + µwt = wt − pt
Hence, it follows that the unemployment rate can be written, in terms of deviation
from steady state values, as
but = 1ϕ bµwt
i.e., fluctuations in the unemployment rate are proportional to those in the wage
markup, with the coefficient of proportionality given by the (Frisch) elasticity of
labor supply. Figure 7(b) illustrates the empirical validity of that predictions, by
displaying both the cyclical unemployment rate and the wage markup. The positive
comovement between the two series is quite striking, with the correlation coefficient
being equal to 0.92.
5 Policy Implications
The results thus far suggest that the business cycle is associated with large co-incident
movements in the efficiency gap. A decomposition of the gap, further, suggests that
the countercyclical movement in the wage markup is by far the most important source
of overall variations in the gap. This in turn suggests two possible interpretations of
observed markup variations.
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First, they might reflect desired changes in the markups by firms and workers in an
environment where price and wages are flexibles. Examples of changes in desired price
markups include the models discussed in Rotemberg andWoodford (1995), while non-
Walrasian labor market dynamics have been discussed in Danthine and Donaldson
(1990, 1995) and Galí (1996), among others. Alternatively, markup changes may be
the unintended consequence of the existence of price and wage rigidities.
Since monetary policy has very limited role to play on the first scenario, our
discussion will focus on the second environment. Recently, Erceg, Henderson and
Levin (1999) has developed a simple theoretical framework in which the analysis
of monetary policy in the presence of price and wage stickiness can be cast. In
that framework, mantaining price stability is still the main task for monetary policy
design, but as a result of the different distorsions affecting the allocation of resources
in the economy, several additional findings emerge from their analysis. First, their
framework allows one to derive an approximation to the welfare of the representative
consumer, which naturally can be taken as the objective function of the central bank.
It can be shown that the relevant objective function for a benevolent central bank (i.e.,
one that seeks to maximize the utility of the representative household) depends on
the variances of the output gap, price inflation, and wage inflation. In that context,
when both nominal price and wage rigidities coexist, it can be shown that is not
possible for the central bank to attain the first best or efficient outcome; instead the
central bank faces a trade-off involving the stabilization of these variables.
In particular, the relative weights of output gap, price and wage inflation on
the loss function are functions of the relative degree of stickiness. Hence, if price
stickiness is dominant then is optimal for the central bank to focus predominantly
on price inflation, while allowing wages to carry much of the burden necessary for
real adjusment. If rigidities are mainly concentrated in the labor market, and so on
wages, then it might be desirable, at least theoretically, to attempt to also mitigate
17
variations in the wage markup and so output fluctuations.
The large and dominant fluctuations in the wage markup detected in our empirical
analysis point to the importance of wage rigidities. However, the evidence on relative
small cyclical fluctuations in the price markup has a more ambiguous interpretation.
On the one hand, it might reflect the fact that prices are not very sticky, making it
possible for firms to keep the markups close to its desired levels most of the time. On
the other hand, the low cyclical volatility of price markups may just be capturing the
deliberate (and succsessful) attempt by the central bank to stabilize price markups
as a way to achieve price stability.
Although our analysis does not allow us to discriminate between those two hy-
potheses, two lessons emerge from the previous discussion and the evidence above.
First, we have uncovered a key role of labor market frictions as a source of cyclical
variations in aggregate inefficiency. To the extent that those frictions are mainly
associated to nominal wage rigidity, a stronger focus on wage markups, in addition
to price stabilization, can be called for, since this will be crucial to mitigate business
fluctuations in the economy. But, if real rigidities dominate the observed fluctuations
in wage markups, then the role of monetary policy to moderate inefficient output
fluctuations is much more limited. Perhaps surprisingly, not until recently, labor
market frictions have been incorporated by macroeconomics in the models they have
developed for monetary policy analysis. Further research is needed to assess how the
relative importance of nominal/real wage and price rigidities affect the design of an
optimal monetary policy for the Euro area.
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Table 1. Description of the Variables
Mnemonics : Variable
lfn : labor force
lnn : total employment
lnt : trend employment
pcr : real private consumption
urx : unemployment rate
urt : trend unemployment
win : compensation to employees
yed : GDP deflator
yen : nominal GDP
yer : real GDP
yet : Potential output (GDP)
popemu : Total population
Table 2. Basic Statistics
Baseline Calibration (σ = 1, ϕ = 1)
EMU (1970-2000)
Variable s.d.(%) First Order Correlation with
Autocorrelation Output
GDP 1.83 0.93
Gap 2.48 0.96 0.65
Price Markup 1.18 0.88 0.07
Wage Markup 2.20 0.93 -0.76
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Appendix 1
Variable Markups and the GAP: A simple model
Households
The economy consists of a continuum of households indexed by i ∈ [0, 1] whith
preferences represented by the following expected utility function:
max
Ct,Nt,Bt
E0
∞X
t=0
βt
·
C1−σt (i)
1− σ − at
N1+ϕt (i)
1 + ϕ
¸
(16)
where Ct(i) andNt(i) represent consumption and hours of household (i), respectively;
1 > β > 0 is the household discount factor, σ > 0 respresents the relative risk aversion
(i.e. the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution), and ϕ ≥ 0 represent
the inverse of the Frisch labor supply elasticity (when ϕ = 0 preferences are linear
in labor (Hansen (1985)) and the labor supply elasticity is infinite). The variable at
represents exogenous medium run preference shocks. The budget constraint is:
Bt−1 +Wt(i)Nt(i) + Tt +Dt
Pt
= Ct(i) +
Bt(i)/rt
Pt
(17)
The households enter period t with risk-free bonds Bt−1. At the begining of the period
the households receive lump sum nominal transfers Tt and labor incomeWtNt, where
Wt denotes the nominal wage. They also collect a nominal dividend Dt from the
firms. The households consume and use some of these funds to purchase new bonds
at nominal cost Bt/rt, where rt denotes the gross nominal interest rate between t and
t+ 1.
Let Nt(i) denote the household i labour supply (in hours) with Wt(i) the corre-
sponding nominal wage. The household is a monopolistically competitive supplier
of labor. A labor aggregator combines labor services from all households and sells
a bundle of such services in the same proportion as firms would choose according
to the CES production technology defined above Nt =
·R 1
0
Nt(i)
εWt−1
εWt di
¸ εWt
εWt−1
. The
aggregator minimizes the cost of producing a given amount of aggregate labor taking
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Wt(i) as given. The household i labor demand is given by:
Nt(i) =
µ
Wt(i)
Wt
¶−εWt
Nt
where Nt is aggregate per capita hours and, from the zero profit condition of the
labor aggregator we obtain that Wt ≡
³R 1
0
Wt(i)
1−εWt di
´ 1
1−εWt is the aggregate wage
index. Notice that we allow for the elasticity of labor demand to vary over time. This
can capture either real or nominal rigidities in the labor market.
The first order conditions of this problem are given by:
λt(i) = C−σt (i) (18)
at MRSt(i) (1 + µ
W
t ) =
µ
Wt(i)
Pt
¶
(19)
λt = βrtEt
λt+1
πt+1
(20)
where πt+1 = Pt+1/Pt, λt the Lagrange multiplier on (17), MRSt(i) = Nϕt (i)Cσt (i)
and µWt =
1
εWt−1
represents the optimal wage markup.
The Representative Finished Goods-Producing Firm
Each period t = 0, 1, 2, .. the firm uses Yt(j) units of each intermediate good
j ∈ [0, 1], purchased at at nominal price Pt(j). Following Dixit and Stiglitz (1977),
the production function of this firm is defined according to the following constant-
returns to scale aggregator:
Yt =
µZ 1
0
Yt(j)
εt−1
εt dj
¶ εt
εt−1
where εt > 1 will vary over time due to several reasons related to entry-exit dynamics
of the market (see e.g. Rotemberg and Woodford (1999)). The representative firm
demands the differentiated goods in an efficient manner to maximize its profits:
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Pt
µZ 1
0
Yt(j)
εt−1
εt dj
¶ εt
εt−1
−
Z 1
0
Pt(j)Yt(j) dj
The first order conditions of this problem generate the following isoelastic demand
function for intermediate inputs:
Yt(j) =
µ
Pt(j)
Pt
¶−εt
Yt
In equilibrium, a zero profit condition implies that the aggregate price is given by the
following expression:
Pt =
µZ 1
0
Pt(j)
1−εt dj
¶ 1
1−εt
Intermediate Goods-Producing Firms
The production function for firm j is,
Yt(j) = ZtNt(j)
a (21)
where Nt(j) represents the number of hours hired from the households
Nt(j) =
·Z 1
0
Nt(i)
εWt−1
εWt di
¸ εWt
εWt−1
and Zt is a common technology parameter, and a is the output elasticity to hours.
Cost Minimization
The firm j chooses factor (i.e. labor) demand in a perfectly competitive market.
Hence, it chooses Nt(j) to minimize total costs:
min
{Nt(j)}
Wt
Pt
Nt(j) (22)
subject to
Yt(j)− ZtNt(j)a = 0
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The demand for labor is given by:
MCt(j) MPNt(j) =
Wt
Pt
(23)
where MPNt(j) =
∂Yt(j)
∂Nt(j) = FN,t, and MCt(j) is the Lagrange multiplier that can be
interpreted as the real marginal cost of producing an additional unit of output. Notice
that, given cost minimization, the firm will take MCt(j) as given when choosing its
output price. Alternatively, the inverse of theMCt(j), i.e. MCt(j)−1 = 1+µpt(i) can
be considered as a firm price-markup. Notice that under our assumption of a = 1,
the real marginal costs, i.e. the price markup is equal across firms, i.e. µpt =
1
εt−1
.
The GAP
From expressions (19) and (23) it is easy to obtain that, in a symmetric equilibrium
MPNt
1 + µpt
=
Wt
Pt
= at MRSt (1 + µ
W
t )
Rearranging terms
MRSt
MPNt
= GAPt =
1
at
¡
1 + µpt
¢
(1 + µWt )
which under the assumption of no preference shocks can be log-linearized to get the
expression in the text.
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Appendix 2
Alternative Detrending and the Gap
In this appendix we check the robustness of the cyclical properties of the gap to
alternative detrending methods. In particular, we compare our baseline case with
three alternative cases. The first one consists on a 3rd order polynomial in trend,
the second is calculated using a standard HP filter with smoothing parameter 1600,
and finally we also constuct a cyclical measure based on the BP filter selecting the
cyclical frequencies between 2 to 60 quarters. As can be seen from the figure below,
the alternative measures behave on a relatively similar way, specially from mid 70’s
onward, as our baseline cyclical component.
Baseline 3rd Pol. trend HP BP
The Euro area Gap
Alternative Cyclical Decompositions
1970 1973 1976 1979 1982 1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 2000
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
Figure 1: Alternative detrending and the Euro area Gap
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Appendix 3
The Gap and Technology Shocks
As we have discussed in the main text, the cyclical movements in the gap can be
contaminated by the presence of preference shocks. In this Appendix we show that
the high frequency movements in our baseline gap cannot be simply due to preference
shocks.
Under the null hypothesis of preference shocks our gap measure should be exoge-
nous, i.e. unaffected by other sort of shocks in the economy. We next present a simple
test that reject the null of exogeneity, since we show that the gap and its components
react quite strongly to technology shocks.
We have estimated the dynamic response of our gap variable to an identified ex-
ogenous productivity shock. The identification scheme is the one recently proposed
by Galí (1999).13 We estimate a four lag VAR over the sample period 1970-2000 in-
cluding the growth rate of labor productivity, the cyclical measure of employment
and marginal costs, the consumption output ratio and the changes in the GDP de-
flator. From our estimated VAR we can recover the time series properties of the gap
as well as the wage markup for our baseline calibration. In the next Figure we show
the estimated responses to a positive productivity of selected variables. Interestingly,
the inefficiency gap increases significantly in response to a permanent postive pro-
ductivity shock, in line with employment and output. This endogenous reaction, of
course, is inconsistent with the preference shock hypothesis, but fully consistent with
our hypothesis that countercyclical markups.
13We identify the productivity shock as the only one having permanent effects on labor produc-
tivity.
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Estimated Impulse Responses to a Productivity Shock
Euro area (1970-2000)
productivity
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
0.40
0.45
0.50
0.55
gdp
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
employment
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
the gap
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24
0.0
0.8
1.6
2.4
3.2
4.0
4.8
5.6
6.4
price markup
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24
-0.20
-0.15
-0.10
-0.05
-0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
wage markup
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24
-6.4
-5.6
-4.8
-4.0
-3.2
-2.4
-1.6
-0.8
-0.0
0.8
Figure 2: Impulse responses to a Productivity Shock
Appendix 4
Alternative Price and Wage Markups
A) Price Markup with Labor Adjustment Costs
The real marginal costs, mct, (i.e. the inverse of the markup) is given by: mct =
wpt
FNt
, where wpt is the real wage and FNt is the partial derivative of the production
function (i.e. of output) with respect to labor. Under the previous assumptions, the
real marginal costs can be expressed as follows:
mct =
wt
FNt
=
st
γt
where st is the labor income share, and γ is the elasticity of output with respect to
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labor. In log-deviations from steady state (mc = 1
µ
= sγ , where µ is the steady state
markup), the previous expression is just:
dmct = bst − bγt (24)
The benchmark case used in this paper is based upon the assumption of no ad-
justment costs, and a constant elasticity of of output with respect to labor. Hence,
the expression (24) collapses to: dmct = bst.
Following Rotemberg and Woodford (1999), we consider the effect of having cost
of adjusting labor. These costs take the form: UtNtφ(Nt/Nt−1), where Ut is the price
of the input required to make the adjustment. In this case, the real adjustment costs
associated with hiring an additional worker for one period is given by:
(Ut/Pt){φ(Nt/Nt−1)+(Nt/Nt−1)φ0(Nt/Nt−1)}−Et[qt,t+1{(Ut+1/Pt+1)(Nt+1/Nt)2φ0(Nt+1/Nt)}]
letting ζt ≡
qt−1,t(Ut/Pt)
(Ut−1/Pt−1)
, and gNt ≡ (Nt/Nt−1), we can approximate the previous
expression by:
(Ut/Pt)φ00(1){cgNt − ζEt[dgNt+1]}
Assuming that the ratio Ut/Wt is stationary, the real marginal costs are given by:
mct = (
st
γ
)[1 + (U/W )φ00(1){cgNt − ζEt[dgNt+1]}]
which, in terms of deviations from steady state yields
dmct = bst + ξ{cgNt − ζEt[dgNt+1]} (25)
where ξ = µ−1(U/W )φ00(1). Under the assumption that the employment follows a
random walk, then
dmct = bst + ξ{cgNt}
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B) Wage Markup with Time-Non Separabilities in Hours
Let assume that household preferences are given by:
U(Ct, Nt) = logCt + ψ
(N∗t )
1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
where ψ is constant parameter and
N∗t = Nt + bNt−1
with 0 ≤ b < 1. This specification incorporates time dependence in hours as empha-
sized by Kydland and Prescott (1982), Eichenbaum, Hansen and Singleton (1988)
among others.
In this model the (log linear aproximation around steady state of the) marginal
rate of substitution between consumption and income can be described as follows:
mrst = ct + ϕ
£
γnn∗t + (1− γn)n∗t+1
¤
n∗t = βnnt + (1− βn)nt−1
with γn = (1 + βb)−1, and βn = (1 + b)−1.
Notice that the previous expressions can be rewritten as follows:
mrst = ct + ϕnt + ϕEt {Ψt+1}
where
Et {Ψt+1} = γn(1− βn)nt−1 + [(γnβn − 1) + (1− γn)(1− βn)]nt + (1− γn)βnEtnt+1
Notice that under intertemporal separability βn = γn = 1, and Ψt+1 = 0, so we
obtain the baseline specification for the mrst. Thus, the wage markup displays time
dependence as follows:
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(µwt )
NS = (wt − pt)−mrst =
(wt − pt)− [ct + ϕnt]− ϕEt {Ψt+1} =
µwt − ϕEt {Ψt+1}
where (µwt )
NS represents the wage markup under time non-separabilities as a
function of the baseline wage markup, µwt , and the variable Et {Ψt+1}. We set b = 0.5
as a benchmark case.
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The Euro area Gap Components
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Figure 3 
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Figure 4 
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Figure 5 
 
The Gap and the Wage Markup in the Euro area
Baseline
1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000
-6.4
-4.8
-3.2
-1.6
-0.0
1.6
3.2
4.8
6.4
Phi=5.0
1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
20
gap wage mkup
Phi=0.1
1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 37
 
Figure 6(a) 
Baseline Adjustment Costs
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Figure 6(b) 
Baseline Time-Non Separab
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Figure 7(a) 
AWM GGL
Output Gaps: Euro area
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Figure 7(b) 
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